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Abstract
Despite three decades of reform, China’s electricity sector is still
organized by a “new reformed plan” where capacity investment
has been liberalized but prices and production remain controlled.
This paper examines the impact of the current plan prices on
end-users with reference to the OECD and how the plan price of
electricity supply is formed.We argue that the plan price is set in
an attempt to balance the interests of the public and the power
industry. We find that China’s industries do not pay a cheaper
price for electricity than the West, and the plan price is formed
through bargain between the firm and the state, which allows the
firm to have a soft price constraint on its costs.
1. Introduction
Broadly speaking, since 1990, China’s power generation
sector has been liberalized gradually to both domestic
private and state investment and to international invest-
ment as well. The generation sector consists mainly of
state-owned or state-controlled companies, although pri-
vate and foreign companies are given the access to invest
in power generation (Rosen and Houser 2007; Kroeber,
Lee, and Yao 2008). In 2007, the ªve largest central-
government-directly-owned power corporations1 had
43 percent of installed generating capacity compared
with 40 percent of the capacity controlled by local govern-
* I am grateful to Albert Park at Oxford University, my col-
leagues at Brunel University, Wing Thye Woo, and other partic-
ipants at the Asian Economic Panel Meeting in Tokyo 2010 for
their valuable comments in help of revising the paper. All er-
rors are mine.
1 The largest ªve power corporations are Huaneng, Datang,
Guodian, Huadian, and China Power International.
ments and 6 percent by private owners (SERC 2008). The largest ªve have been re-
structured since 2003, this enables them to list their subsidiaries in both domestic
and Hong Kong stock markets to raise private capital in support of further invest-
ment in capacity. As a result of free entry into the industry, China installed new ca-
pacity (390 gigawatt hours [GWh]) in the 2002–07 period that was equivalent of
more than three times the total capacity of Germany (Kroeber, Lee, and Yao 2008).
China produces more than 500 billion GWh a year, making it the second largest elec-
tricity power producer in the world.
There has not been the same deregulation in the other parts of the electricity supply
chain such as power distribution and retail sales, however. Once capacity is built up,
the use of that capacity to generate power for sales has still been strictly regulated
by the state (Liu 2006; Wang 2006). Besides the continued control on quantity pro-
duced, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) also deter-
mines both the price at which generators can sell their power to the grid and the
price that the grid can charge end-users (Rosen and Houser 2007). This partially lib-
eralized system has been called the “new reformed plan system.”
Currently, there are two regional power grid companies: the State Grid Corporation
and the China Southern Power Grid. The state sets up “on-grid prices” to regulate
power plants in selling their electricity to the grid company that has a regional mo-
nopoly that is in charge of both the high-voltage electricity transmission and the
low-voltage distribution to a region. This regulated price for consumers is called a
catalogue price. The grid company’s proªts are mainly determined by the difference
between the on-grid price and the catalogue price.
Despite 30 years of economic reforms, why does China still use a state plan for its
electric power sector? There are numerous academic studies as well as studies by
commercial interests on China’s electricity supply (e.g., Andrews and Dow 2000;
Lam 2004; Bradley and Yang 2006; Wang 2006; Rosen and Houser 2007; Wang 2007).
Our study will address the question through understanding a key issue of the
industry—electricity pricing by the state.
This paper will discuss, institutionally, how the NDRC sets a basic plan price as gui-
dance for the provincial development and reform commission to agree on a plan
price with a local power producer. The price agreement is made through bargaining
between two parties by considering the interest of government development policy,
the cost of the power ªrm, and other conditions of the business. This price bargain-
ing mechanism leads each ªrm to receive an individually tailored plan price for
selling its power to the grid. The ªrm has an incentive to inºuence the local planner
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to set a plan price in the ªrm’s favor. We argue that, as a result this new reformed
plan system allows the ªrm to face a soft price constraint on its costs in a sharp con-
trast to the hard price constraint imposed by a perfectly competitive market.
We organize our analysis as follows. Section 2 highlights the structure of the Chi-
nese electricity supply with reference to the United Kingdom (UK) as an example of
full electricity market liberalization. Section 3 examines whether electricity is
cheaper in China than in the OECD economies. Section 4 models the bargaining
mechanism that sets the plan price. Section 5 tests our model using a panel sample
of more than 110 power ªrms over 2003–05. Section 6 summarizes our ªndings and
their economic implications.
2. Structure of China’s power supply with reference to the UK
As a reference, we show the structure of the UK electricity supply in Figure 1. In
contrast to the reference, China’s supply structure is shown in Figure 2. Figure 1
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Figure 1. The structure of the UK electricity market
Source: Based on the information from “The Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics 2006.”
Note: p m
c market price of the coal; Fn the nth power ªrm; pt the electricity price paid by traders to power ªrms; pr the electricity
price paid by household users to power traders; pb  the electricity price paid traders to investment banks; pw the wholesale electricity
price paid by large users to traders; pf the electricity price paid by the investment banks to power ªrms through the future supply
contracts; pl the electricity price paid by large users to power ªrms ; c power ªrm’s costs; m the proªt margin of the power ªrm;
mt trader’s premiums; mb bank’s premiums; g grid’s costs; d discount for large users.
shows that the retail and the wholesale market are separated in the UK. In the
wholesale market, any large-quantity buyers (this includes wholesale traders, large
industry users, and even investment banks) can directly approach power ªrms to
purchase electricity at a negotiated price. This institutional change is expected to
stimulate direct competition between power ªrms in selling electricity to large buy-
ers and also to households via retail traders. Because consumers are given a choice
of their suppliers, competition is inevitable between power producers and also be-
tween retail traders in the resale of power to households.
In the Figure 1, pcm is the price paid to coal producers by power producers or ªrms;
Fn indicates an nth power ªrm in the power generation sector; pt is a trade price paid
by large volume buyers, such as electricity traders, investment banks, and large in-
dustrial users, to power producers; pb is a price paid by the traders for buying elec-
tricity from investment banks that hold power production through futures contracts
with power producers; pf is the ªxed price of the futures contract paid by invest-
ment banks to power producers; pr is a retail price paid by ªnal household users to
the traders; pw is a wholesale price by large industrial users to the traders with
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Figure 2. The structure of electricity industry in China
Source: Based on the information from Wang (2007) and China Electricity Market & Tariffs Monitoring Report 2005.
Note: x  the quantity of coal supply; ni the quantity of excessive power production of the ith power ªrm; qi the plan output of the ith
power ªrm; pl
c  the market coal price paid by the ith power ªrm for excessive power production; pt
c  the plan coal price paid by the ith
power ªrm; Fk the kth power ªrm; pk the plan price given to the kth power ªrm to sell its produced electricity; p  the average plan
electricity price; pg the average electricity price for end-users; g grid’s costs; pg
w  the electricity price for large users; pg
s  the elec-
tricity price for household users; pg
i  the electricity price for agriculture and low income users.
discount d; c is the marginal costs of producers and m is the proªt margin added by
producers on the costs; mb is a proªt margin charged by an investment bank in its
price; and g is the marginal costs of transmission charged by the grid company.
The competitive structure of the UK is not built up without cost. One cost is the cre-
ation of an extra layer of trading (or the “middle men”) between the end users and
the power producers. The middle traders seek transaction premiums, denoted by mt
(trader’s premiums) or mb (bank’s premiums) in Figure 1, in which the premiums
could be higher if they are collusive in setting trade conditions. Moreover, recently,
investment banks were brought into the power trading business to purchase power
using a futures supply contract at a ªxed price (pf) paid to the power ªrms for a spe-
ciªed future time. Futures supply contracts are helpful in reducing income-stream
uncertainty for power ªrms in the foreseeable future. They are costly for the end us-
ers or even other wholesale traders, however, who need to buy one from the bank at
a higher price than the normal trade price (pt) paid for the direct purchase of power,
making pf  pt, since the futures price embeds the risk cost in price volatility. If a fu-
tures supply contract is resold to another bank with an expectation that the price
will be higher, then one more margin will be added in the price, and if there are
n runs of resale of the contract among banks, the ªnal price paid by the trader or
consumers can end up with a payment at
pb  pf  m  g ,
where g is the costs of the power grid. It is reported that some 90 percent of power
in the UK has been bought by investment banks using futures contracts. This mixed
imperfect market competition and application of ªnancial derivatives to power
trading explains partly why the banks are exposed more and more to the risk of a
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Table 1. Cost structure of UK electricity in 2002
Percentage of price (%) Costs and prices (£/kWh) Percentage difference between
Household and I&CaHousehold I&C Household I&C
Generation 40 60 0.035 0.026 26
Transmission 3 5 0.003 0.002 33
Distribution 25 24 0.022 0.010 53
Retail (supply) 26 11 0.023 0.005 79
Other 6 0 0.005 0.000 100
Price 100 100 0.087 0.043 51
Source: Authors’ own calculation on the basis of 1) “Gas and Electricity Price Projections,” OXERA, 2004, 2) “The New Electricity
Trading Arrangements in England and Wales,” National Audit Ofªce, 2002–03: 9 May 2003, pp. 19–20, and 3) “Electricity Informa-
tion 2006,” IEA.
Note: a. The percentage difference  (Household costs  Industrial & commercial costs) / Household costs.
I&C  industrial & commercial users.
fall in demand for power, and partly why there is an increasing concern on a huge
rise in electricity costs for the end users over recent years in the UK. Table 1 indi-
cates that the actual cost of middle men / middle traders accounts for roughly
26 percent of the price for households, 11 percent of the price for industrial users,
and households are charged 79 percent higher than industrial users.
In contrast, China takes a different structure of supply that helps avoid the cost of
the middle traders, see Figure 2. China has some 80 percent of electricity from coal-
ªred power plants, and more than 50 percent of the coal (2.3 billion tons) produced
in 2006 was consumed by power generation. There are no middle traders between
the power producers and the end users. As described in Figure 2, the state regulates
both transactions between power ªrms and a grid company and between the grid
ªrm and the end users in terms of prices and output. The state sets a plan price (p)
and an annual output quota (q) for each power ªrm to produce and trade to guaran-
tee their basic revenues earned from the fulªlment of planned production through
delivery to the grid company. The grid company has a limited degree of autonomy
in choosing competitive or low-cost power ªrms to produce outputs above the plan
when excessive demand appears. In response to excessive demand, power ªrms
may be called to produce excessive output (n) above the basic plan. A price paid for
the ªrm to produce excessive output can be negotiated between the producer and
the local government of the end users. Often, if the excessive output of electricity
needs to export to other provinces or regions where there is power shortage, the lo-
cal government of the producer will act on behalf of the producer to negotiate with
the local government of the end users in the other place. The sales above the basic
plan are small for the ªrm, however, usually less than 10 percent of the total sales of
the ªrm (Liu 2006).
In Figure 2, for simplicity, we deªne the negotiated price as the same as the plan
price of the basic output of a power ªrm. As can be seen, p is an ex factory price
planned by the state for each power ªrm to sell its electricity to the grid; q is output
quantity planned by the state for each power ªrm; n is output produced by a power
ªrm in excess of the planned quantity; p g is a planned price paid by end users to the
grid; and g is a price margin added by the grid on the power ªrm’s ex factory price.
pi
c is the plan price of coal paid by a power ªrm to the coal producers; pi
c is the mar-
ket price of coal paid by a power ªrm to the coal producers to produce excessive
output; x(q) is the quantity of coal bought by a power ªrm to produce planned out-
put. x(n) is the quantity of coal bought by a power ªrm to produce excessive out-
put outside plan.
One interesting feature of Figure 2 is that the role of the middle trader is played by
the grid company. The grid buys all electricity from power ªrms and then resells it
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to the end users at the catalogue price set by the state. The state groups end users
according to industrial/commercial users, household residential users, and low-
income users. The affordability of each group is different, therefore they are charged
discriminatively by the state (see Table 2). In 2006, 2,182 billion kilowatt hours
(kWh) were sold to industrial/commercial users, 324 billion kWh went to house-
hold residential users, and 319 billon kWh were taken by low-income regions and
agricultural users. Apparently, the price discrimination against the users according
to their affordability indicates that plan prices are taken as “an instrument” partly to
serve a political interest of social justice and partly to serve regional or industrial de-
velopment policy. For instance, the users in low-income regions pay a price almost
two times less than high-income domestic households. For the same analogy, agri-
cultural users pay a lower price than industrial users. From 2000 to 2004, the indus-
trial price of electricity increased by 23 percent, whereas the agricultural price only
increased by 11 percent.
Figure 2 not only shows that the state ªxes the prices of power sales but also that it
ªxes the prices of input such as coal in order to help reduce the volatile impact of in-
put cost on the stability of the plan price. Although the coal market has been liberal-
ized since 1993, the price of coal for electricity production (known as electricity coal)
has still been strictly regulated by the state. The power ªrm pays a regulated price
for coal (pC ) to the coal supplier who then provides the power ªrm with the planned
quantity of coal (xC ). The planned quantity of coal only allows the power ªrm to
produce the planned output of power (q) that the ªrm is given by the state. For any
power output above the plan, there is no guarantee of supply of the planned coal.
Because the planned coal is cheaper than the market-sale coal, the coal producer has
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Table 2. China’s catalogue prices of electricity for end users
Unit: Yuan/MWh 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Big industrial usesa 372 380 NA 426 457
Common & non-industrial usesb 430 520 NA 583 614
Household usesc 379 380 NA 443 447
Lighting uses (non-household)d 500 590 NA 620 776
Commercial service sector usese 670 690 NA 754 643
Agricultural sector usesf 329 330 NA 359 365
Poor counties irrigation usesg 146 150 NA 156 166
Sales in excess of planh 328 330 NA 351 374
Average 376 396 410 435 458
Source: Electricity Market and Electricity Prices Monitoring Report 2005.
Note: The catalogue (a) applies to the one, of which the capacitor exceeds 315 kV; (b) applies to the one, of which the capacitor is below
315 kV, the government departments, and the public services providers; (c) applies to the residents, kindergartens, schools, and rest
homes; (d) applies to the users of the signal lamp, the street lamp, the arc lamp, and the neon light; (e) applies to the business services
providers; (f) applies to those involved in the farming activities; (g) applies to the low-income counties; and (h) refers to the prices of the
traded electricity in excess of plan.
no incentive to sell coal any more than the plan requires, leaving the power ªrm
with difªculties in acquiring excessive plan coal.
It is not cheaper to produce excessive power (n) because the ªrm has to pay a mar-
ket price for coal. As shown in Figure 3, the planned electricity coal is cheaper than
other coal sold at a market price by 28.95 yuan/metric ton, and the gap between the
plan and market prices increased up to 43.92 yuan/metric ton in 2004. This implies,
ªrst, that the planned electricity coal is underpriced signiªcantly by the state when
compared to the market. This may reºect the intention of the state to “subsidize” a
plan-taking power ªrm with a lower coal price. Secondly, the procurement of coal
from the market at a higher price can lead the ªrm to reduce proªts by producing
more output above the plan. To avoid this situation where the marginal costs are
higher than marginal revenues, an alternative is to stop the excessive or non-
planned production, which can create a problem of power shortage. This partly ex-
plains why power supply has been short sometimes in recent years, not because of a
shortage of generating capacity, but the inability to resource cheap coal (Kroeber,
Lee, and Yao 2008).
This discussion indicates that the state apparently internalizes all transactions by
plan from input acquirement to output sales. In the meantime, it liberalizes both ca-
pacity investment and demand for power consumption. With this mix of a free-
investment and plan-output system, the ªrm is given more plan output with its
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Figure 3. Market price of coal and plan price of electricity coal in China
Source: Energy Data 2005.
capacity (see Figure 4). The close link of plan output with capacity stimulates the
ªrm to invest more in capacity because this will help the ªrm grow and therefore
earn more proªts when a proªt margin is included in the plan price. Due to the par-
tial plan regulation to the coal market, it is difªcult for a power ªrm to acquire more
cheap planned coal in order to produce excessive outputs above the plan. With this
difªculty, the marginal costs can be higher than the marginal revenues if the ªrm
produces output in excess of the plan.
In short, the existing reformed plan system is different from traditional planning at
least in three aspects: (1) decentralized investment decision from the state to the
ªrm, (2) no consumption rationing imposed on demand, and (3) shifting manage-
ment’s accountability from plan fulªlment to proªts. The ªrst aspect means that
competition can be developed for capacity expansion among power ªrms. The third
aspect of proªt accountability means that the ªrm is commercialized and takes the
planned output target as a vehicle needed to generate sales and therefore proªts that
the ªrm seeks. The reform largely explains why the industry has built up its market-
based investment mechanism to effectively respond to demand in help of avoiding a
capacity shortage in the long run. Figure 5 shows a cyclical pattern of the balance of
power supply in terms of its installed capacity and demand over 1981 to 2007. The
ªgure clearly indicates a swing of supply capacity from shortage to surplus as a re-
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Figure 4. Producer-invested capacity and state-planned output
Source: Plotted on the basis of data sources from National Bureau of Statistics of China, and China Electric Power Yearbook 2005 and
2006.
sult of ªrms’ responsiveness of capacity expansion to demand growth from the
1990s when reform was deepened.
3.Do Chinese consumers pay less for electricity?
Are Chinese households better off in a regulated supply than the UK counterparts in
a deregulated market? Interestingly, the answers are not deªnite, and depend on
which criterion we refer to. For instance, from a consumer’s point of view, which-
ever system has the lower price is the better the system. A lower price will help
“consumer welfare improvement.” Tables 3 and 4 show an interesting comparison
of prices in terms of households and industrial users, respectively, between China’s
plan price and the UK/OECD market price over 2000–05.
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Figure 5. The balance of installed capacity and demand
Source: The data are collected from the China Electric Power Yearbook 1980–2008, and the calculation is based on the suggestion from
Arthur Kroeber (2008).
Table 3. Wholesale prices of electricity for industry: China and OECD
Price (US$/KWh) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
China 0.0449 0.0459 0.0487 0.0515 0.0552 0.0730
UK 0.0550 0.0510 0.0520 0.0550 0.0670 0.0870
France 0.0360 0.0350 0.0370 0.0450 0.0500 0.0500
United States 0.0460 0.0500 0.0480 0.0510 0.0530 0.0570
Canada 0.0400 0.0430 0.0410 0.0490 0.0490 0.0553
Germany 0.0410 0.0440 0.0490 0.0650 0.0770 0.0840
Italy 0.0890 0.1070 0.1130 0.1470 0.1610 0.1739
Japan 0.1430 0.1270 0.1150 0.1220 0.1270 0.1227
Source: IEA, Electricity Information 2006, 36–39, and Economic and Social Data Service.
As can be seen in Table 3, prices are for industrial users and comparable in U.S. dol-
lars given by the International Energy Agency (IEA), and there is not a signiªcant
difference in wholesale prices between China and OECD countries except Italy and
Japan. The similarity of wholesale prices between most OECD countries suggests a
price convergence to competitive equilibrium due to competition. The plan price in
China is close to the OECD competitive level and implies that ªnancially the Chi-
nese industries do not gain any competitive advantage in acquiring cheaper power
than their OECD counterparts.
Why are they similar when China has lower labor costs, a lower rate of internaliza-
tion of environmental costs, a lower capital cost of construction, and lower coal
prices? For instance, the price of the electricity coal has been less than 50 percent in
the UK (see Figure 6). Furthermore, labor costs in China are also much lower than
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Figure 6. Coal prices for electricity production: China and the UK
Source: China Electricity Year Book 2005, Energy Data 2005, and IEA Electricity Information 2007.
Table 4. Electricity price for household users: China and OECD
Price (US$/KWh) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
China 0.0458 0.0459 0.0497 0.0535 0.0540 0.0610
UK 0.1070 0.1010 0.1050 0.1160 0.1380 0.1491
France 0.1020 0.0980 0.1050 0.1270 0.1410 0.1416
United States 0.0820 0.0850 0.0850 0.0870 0.0900 0.0945
Canada 0.0530 0.0530 0.0540 0.0620 0.0676 0.0757
Germany 0.1210 0.1240 0.1360 0.1760 0.1980 0.2124
Italy 0.1350 0.1480 0.1560 0.1860 0.1910 0.1975
Japan 0.2140 0.1880 0.1740 0.1860 0.1960 0.1888
Source: IEA, Electricity Information 2006, 36–39, and Economic and Social Data Service.
the OECD level; an average labor cost per worker in a proªtable Chinese power ªrm
is about RMB 40,000 a year when compared with RMB 433,000 a year at Drax, which
is the UK’s largest coal-ªred power ªrm.
Moreover, due to a plan cap by the state, the proªt margin of a power ªrm is not
high, some 6 percent of the price or even lower in the two most recent years when
coal prices soared (see Figure 7). This leaves only two possible explanations. One at-
tribute is a high charge in power transmission and distribution—for instance, the
two monopolistic grid corporations received total revenues of US$ 163 billion from
end users and paid out US$ 98 billion to all power ªrms that supplied 2,834 billion
kWh to the transmission in 2006. This shows that, on average, the costs of transmis-
sion charges accounted for 40 percent of the end-user price, which is higher than the
UK wholesale level of 29 percent in the price (5 percent on high voltage trans-
mission and 24 percent on low voltage distribution, see Table 1). Another possible
attribute is a high level of overhead costs that may offset advantages of costs in
production. This will be discussed later in the paper.
Turning to household users, if we take the wholesale price for industrial users as a
baseline in measuring how high an electricity price is charged on households above
the baseline, we ªnd that the Chinese households are charged least relative to the
wholesale price (see Tables 4 and 5). Again in 2005, the households were charged
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Figure 7. Proªt margins in China’s power generation and coal mining
Source: Kroeber, Lee, and Yao (2008).
even less (16 percent) than the industrial users. In contrast, UK households were
charged about twice the wholesale price, and France was even worse, charging al-
most three times higher than the wholesale price. The higher retail prices relative to
the competitively formed wholesale price imply a higher transaction cost of retail in
OECD countries when compared with China, in which the higher cost may come
from the market power of retailers due to imperfect market competition, or it may
come from higher costs incurred by them. Regardless of the sources of the cost, what
we are clear about is that the closer the retail price is to the wholesale price, the
lower the market transaction cost is on the small users. From this aspect of saving
the market transaction cost in the retail trade, China’s internalization of market
transaction through plan outperforms the UK’s externalization of transaction
through market.
Table 5 also indicates that there is no clear evidence on signiªcant price across subsi-
dies from industry to households because the price ratio of the households to the in-
dustry is quite close to one—except in 2005 when the price of the industrial users
rose by some 30 percent in compensation for a huge rise in coal costs. Despite a rela-
tively lower price of electricity for Chinese households, they consume only 11.5 per-
cent of total electricity of 2,825 billion kWh in 2006, and the rest was mostly con-
sumed by industries and other commercial establishments. Additionally, the
demand structure is quite different from OECD, for example, U.S. households con-
sume some 45 percent of the power.
On this basis, we argue that the plan price is higher, not relative the OECD level, but
relative to the potential of the cost saving that can be made by both the Chinese
power ªrms and the grid that runs the transmission and distribution for their end
users. This suggests that the Chinese industries can be powered more competitively
if reform can lead the power ªrms to improve their cost efªciency further.
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Table 5. China’s household price above industrial price with reference to OECD
Household Price/
Industrial Price 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
China 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.04 0.98 0.84
UK 1.93 1.98 2.03 2.12 2.07 1.71
France 2.71 2.82 2.86 2.82 2.83 2.92
United States 2.04 2.05 2.04 1.80 1.62 1.66
Canada 1.19 1.09 1.19 1.13 1.13 1.38
Germany 2.98 2.82 2.79 2.68 2.57 2.52
Italy 1.52 1.38 1.38 1.27 1.18 1.14
Japan 1.40 1.38 1.41 1.42 1.44 1.56
Source: The OECD data of the electricity prices are collected from IEA, Electricity Information 2006; the Chinese data are collected
from Electricity Market and Electricity Prices Monitoring Report 2005; the data of exchange rate are collected from DataStream.
4.How is a plan price formed?
4.1 The structure of plan prices and plan supply in relation to demand
There are four prices that can decisively affect power supply and demand: coal
prices that the power producers pay to coal-mining companies, on-grid prices that
the grid company pays the power producers for buying their output, transmission
charges that the grid marks up on using its wires and cables, and end-user prices
paid by electricity consumers to the grid company. Coal prices are classiªed mainly
according to electricity coal prices and other coal prices. The electricity coal is re-
garded as “a strategic product of the nation” and so is regulated by the state for its
quantity and prices to ensure an adequate supply of coal at an affordable price to
power ªrms to produce the planned output and sell it proªtably at the plan price.
Liberalization of the coal price has been attempted since 1992, and the latest attempt
was in 2007, but the attempts were not successful as the role of the plan legacy still
remains in place to mitigate the conºict of interest between the free-market supplies
upstream and the plan-capped sales downstream.
On-grid prices are generally set by the price bureau of the NDRC to ensure the bal-
ance of interests between the end users and the power industry that seeks proªts.
The proªt incentive stimulates the ªrm to expand capacity and also to attract new
entrants. This implies that, for a given plan price, the ªrm shall cover its costs and
also gain some surplus to invest further. As a result, electricity generators are al-
lowed to make an 8–12 percent return on equity, based on industry average costs, so
that they have the incentive to lower their costs below the average and enjoy
a higher return (Kroeber, Lee, and Yao 2008). This claim is consistent with evi-
dence of both the 6 percent proªt margin in the regulated on-grid price, and the
ªnding of a good price mark-up in the price reported by Wang (2006).
Regarding costs embedded in the on-grid price, there are two different types, one at
a regional level and another at a ªrm level. The prices differ with regions. The
NDRC sets its regional prices according to, ªrst, the regional stages of economic de-
velopment that reºects different living costs and affordability, and secondly, the
transportation cost of coal.
Having set a regional on-grid price by the state as a general guidance for an area or
a province, the NDRC allows a further adjustment of the general guidance made by
its local ofªces or local NDRCs to a ªrm-level plan price that an individual power
ªrm can sell at. In reality, it is difªcult to impose a uniªed adjustment for different
power ªrms because their cost conditions and historical context of business are
different. The local NDRC has to be involved in assessing ªrms’ cost conditions
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individually to set up an individual adjustment, resulting in one ªrm with one ad-
justed plan price. This creates an institutional opportunity for power ªrms to
inºuence the state via “lobbying for an on-grid tariff high enough to cover their fuel
costs and ensure that they will be proªtable enough to make the necessary invest-
ments” (Rosen and Houser 2007, 25). The cost adjustment of the general guidance
price is further documented by the Electricity Annals of China (2006) in which the
state stipulates a computational method about how to adjust the general price with
the cost and other conditions of the ªrm such as market conditions, the ªrm’s own
ªnance costs, an intensity of depreciation, fuel costs and other variable costs, and
the capacity utilization rate.
Furthermore, the state also allows a price adjustment to compensate a rise in input
costs, such as coal prices. The price compensation of the cost pass through is not
full, depending on a number of factors, such as a percentage of a rise in coal price
that the ªrm can bear or internally digest, the technical efªciency of power genera-
tors used in turning coal to electricity, and the quality of coal used by the ªrm. For
example, from 2001 to 2003, the coal price in China increased by around 13.7 per-
cent, bringing on-grid prices up by 9.8 percent on average.
This discussion highlights that, ªrst, the cost is a key element that determines the
adjustment of the general plan price for an individual ªrm. Figure 8 clearly demon-
strates this point that the higher costs are associated with higher prices—a typical
pattern of the soft price constraint on costs. Second, the adjustment has to be indi-
vidually made because the cost conditions cannot be identical for every ªrm. As a
result, it is expected that the ªrm will use its cost information to inºuence or negoti-
ate with its local NDRC for a favorable adjustment and therefore receive a higher
plan price. This clearly suggests that negotiation or bargain is inevitable in the pro-
cess of the price setting.
The institutional formation of on-grid prices complicates price equilibrium between
power producers as a seller and the grid corporation as the only buyer who is given
planned grid prices to purchase power from the power ªrms. The grid company re-
sells the power to end users at an end-user tariff or a catalogue price that covers
the on-grid prices, transmission charges, further surcharges on grid investment of
US$ 130 billion between 2006 and 2010 (Rosen and Houser 2007), and some policy
adjustments for different end users. The NDRC sets prices for the end users in a re-
gion in consultation with local governments in an attempt to balance the interests of
various parties. Demand responds directly to the end-user price, but not to the on-
gird prices that are responded by suppliers. Figure 9 shows how these two prices
were related to the capacity of power ªrm, respectively, in 2004. Obviously, the
76 Asian Economic Papers
Understanding the Performance of the Electric Power Industry in China
ªgure shows that the large ªrms are given lower on-grid prices, but the end users
are given a ºat price regardless of the capacity.
In Figure 10, p represents the planned price set by the state for the end users,
which crosses the demand curve D1 at the point O. The market demand in response
to p is q. The difference between q and K measures capacity surplus because K repre-
sents the maximum of total aggregate capacity available in the nation at the time. If
q  K, there is a capacity shortage. To supply q, the aggregate capacity of n ªrms is
chosen, and the n ªrms are ranked according to their marginal costs that will lead
the state to determine their on-grid prices respectively in selling their power. The
line that ranks the marginal cost of each power ªrm is the supply curve. The vertical
length of each level (or a step) on the ladder line (the supply curve) represents an
on-grid price of the ªrm, and the horizontal length between the lower step and the
higher step is the capacity of the ªrm. The monopolistic grid ªrm purchases power
up to q from the power ªrms at given plan prices ranged from the highest pH to the
lowest pL, and then the grid resells q at a single price of p. The income of the grid
ªrm is the sum of gains and losses, where gains are from paying on-grid prices that
are lower than the end-user price, indicated by the area below the price line p and
above the supply curve S (see 1 in the ªgure). In contrast, the losses are from pay-
ing the on-grid prices higher than the end-user price, which is the area of 2 that is
below the supply curve and above the price line p.
Clearly, the diagram shows that the loss of social welfare is not a result of market
power but of the inefªcient supply of the high cost ªrms, indicated by 2. If the line
of the end-user price holds, the shaded loss area of 2 can be reduced by shifting the
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Figure 8. On-grid price and the unit cost of power producers
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China and Electricity Annals of China (2004, 2005).
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Figure 9. Observation of capacity, market demand, and plan supply
Source: National Statistics Bureau of China.
Note: The solid ºat line represents the average price of the end users in 2004, and the dots represent the on-grid price of each power ªrm
for the corresponding year.
Figure 10. Equilibrium structure on-grid prices, and the end-user price
Note: PH the highest on-grid price ; PL the lowest on-grid price; P  the average price of end users; 1 proªt gain of the grid;
2 the losses of the grid; D the demand curve; S the supply curve; q the actual output of the electricity produced; K the maxi-
mal capacity that all of power ªrms can produce; y axis the price of the electricity; x axis the production of the electricity.
supply curve right: either by reducing the on-grid prices of power producers or by
allowing the efªcient ªrms to expand and inefªcient ones to shrink. The price re-
duction creates a conºict of interest for the power ªrms, because they prefer higher
prices to better cover their costs. The high-cost ªrms can also be protected by the
higher price due to the soft price contraint. In short, Figure 10 demonstrates how
plan supply, market demand, and plan prices interact with each other in the Chinese
electricity market.
Empirically, Figure 10 can be illustrated by using the sample of the data of 110
power ªrms located in the southern provinces of China. We plot the on-grid prices
of power ªrms in the South versus their output (the average end-user price in the
south was US$ 55.31 MWh in 2004, see Figure 9). As expected, of 110 power ªrms,
there were 59 ªrms that sold their power to the grid at sale prices below the end-
user price, allowing the grid to earn income of US$ 4,523 million (equivalent to area
1 in Figure 10), when compared with the rest of high-costs-with-high-price ªrms
that made the grid lose US$ 473 million in 2004 (equivalent to area 2 in Figure 10).
The power ªrms that brought losses to the grid are small, with an average annual
output of 6,369 MWh, when compared with the size of an average output of
29,872 MWh of the low-cost ªrms. This indicates that the size of power ªrms mat-
ters not only for cost efªciency but also for the proªtability of the grid ªrm.
4.2 The model of price bargaining between the state and the power ªrms
One phenomenon of the on-grid prices is the soft price constraint on cost: the price
of each ªrm is planned by the state individually in line with its own cost. This im-
plies that the ªrm could negotiate with, or inºuence, the state in setting its plan
price. To model this negotiation process, we start by assuming that the state planner
sets a price to maximize the total output of the whole industry (Q) of the nation for
given resources available at time t. This price is denoted as pt, called an aggregate
plan price for power producers to sell their electricity.
In a symmetric scenario, every power ªrm has an identical cost. If this is the case,
then the planner can set a plan price of each individual ªrm i to equal the aggregate
social plan price at pit  pt.
In fact, ªrms are different and so are costs. Thus the aggregate plan price will
be adjusted by the planner to account for an individual ªrm’s productive condition
and cost, making one ªrm with one plan price reºect different cost conditions of
power ªrms. The adjustment of a plan price for a ªrm’s cost at cit can be described
as follows:
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where 	 is a cost adjustment coefªcient for a plan price at a range between 0 and 1.
If 	  0, it means that the aggregate plan price is fully adjusted to equal the cost of
an individual ªrm. If 	  1, it means that the aggregate plan price is not adjusted at
all and it remains the same. So 	 indicates how far the aggregate plan price is ad-
justed to account the cost of the ªrm. In other words, the more the adjustment the
higher the price of the ªrm will be because the more cost impacts are taken into ac-
count in setting a plan price.
Furthermore, in equation (1), the aggregate plan price pt can be transformed more
speciªcally by specifying the total output of the industry Q as a sum of the planned
aggregate electricity output, q, and the output of other industries using electricity to
produce goods, Qj, which is
Q  q  Qj . (2)
Because the state attempts to set the aggregate plan supply of electricity (q) as much
as possible to meet the output growth of other industries that demand for electricity
as a basic input for their production, it links q with Qj as q  q(Qj) that has the prop-
erty of dq/dQj  0. The plan supply responds not only to the aggregate demand both
in the short run and in the long run, but also to a planned price. The planned price
can serve as an incentive to inºuence the decision of a power ªrm in choosing its ca-
pacity of supply in the long run. Due to the ªrm being given autonomy to choose its
capacity, the higher planned price can induce the ªrm to invest more in capacity.
This will enable the state to have more capacity for planning more output q, so that
this gives q  q[Qj(p),p] with the property of ∂q/∂p  0. Qj(p) states that other indus-
tries are operated in a free market and so their output is a function of a market price
p with ∂Qj/∂p
0. On this basis, we write equation (2) as
Q  q[Qj(p), p]  Qj(p) . (3)
If we consider an argument that the aggregate plan supply of electricity can also
serve as “a strategic constraint” on the output of other industries, in which this has
been a particular case where the shortage of power is common in an economy, then
equation (3) can be augmented as
Q  q[Qj(p), p]  Qj[p, q(p)] . (4)
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With account of the impact of electric power costs or the plan price (p) on the market
price of other products (p), we maximize the total output of both electricity and
other industries, Q, which is the objective of the state planner in choosing a plan
price, and gives the following:
dQ
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Manipulating the above results in
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Then the aggregate plan price becomes:
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e
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q (5.1)
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where e is the price-incentive elasticity of output to reºect how a commercialized
proªt-making ªrm will respond to plan prices in choosing its capacity. The state
plans output for a ªrm according to its capacity, and the elasticity is expected to be
positive since the higher plan price will induce more capacity expansion and, there-
fore, output. This suggests that ε0 due to
dq
dP
.
For , it is expected to be negative. This is, ªrst,  ≤ 0, or at least, in the short run.
A change in electricity prices (p) will not be immediately responded to by a change
in the product price of other industries (p) because (1) product competition can en-
force the ªrm to internally absorb a cost rise as much as possible and (2) the price
adjustment made by the ªrm in response to costs will be lagged. This shows
dq
dP
= 0
in equation (5.2). As a result, we expect  ≤ 0.
Secondly, the marginal output of other industries with respect to supply of
electricity is positive,
¶
¶
Q
q
j
> 0 . This ensures
¶
¶
Q
q
dq
dp
j
> 0 , so that with  ≤ 0 we ex-
pect 
0 in equation (5.2).
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This discussion shows the expectation of the negative relationship between the elec-
tricity price and the aggregate power quantity supplied. The negative relationship
of the supply in relation to the plan price implies that industrial or economic growth
will be very much affected or constrained by power supply. This creates a strategic
incentive for the state to plan not only more quantity needed to be supplied but also
plan that quantity at a lower cost to stimulate demand for power in order to pro-
duce more, and in that way grow the economy. This explains why the electricity
price and quantity supplied is regulated in China because of the growth pursued by
the state.
To substitute equation (5.2) for p(Q) in equation (1) gives us
pit 
e
s
l
lq Ct it
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
−1 . (6.1)
Or, in a non-linear form, the equation can be presented as
pit  q Cq it
lg s l( , )e 1− , (6.2)
where 
 is a coefªcient affected by ε and , and its empirical sign indicates a techno-
logical impact on the other industry in using electricity. The impact will affect the
state planner in setting up its plan price in relation to supply: 
 
 0 means that the
high-electricity-intensity technology is dominant in the production of the other in-
dustries, and therefore the industries are less capable for sustaining the high costs
of power supply. For sustainability, the state is expected to plan more power supply
but at a lower cost in order to stimulate output, and thus economic growth. In
contrast, if 
  0 empirically, it means that the low-electricity-intensity technology
is dominantly adopted by the other industries, and therefore the industries can
be more capable for sustaining the high costs of power supply, in which the
state can leave the power industry to decide how the price shall be set in relation
to required supply.
To turn to the impact of costs on the plan price in equation (6.2), it is expected that
the effect of an individual ªrm’s costs on setting a plan price will lead to one ªrm
with one plan price. In response to this institutional arrangement, the ªrm will be
motivated to play a high-cost strategy. The high-cost strategy can allow the ªrm to
bargain with the state planner for a higher plan price in order to offset the ªrm’s
higher costs. Therefore, the cost will be expected as a central factor affecting the plan
price of a ªrm in the Chinese power industry.
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To test this expectation, we can further break down the cost factor, C, in equation
(6.2) into different cost elements that the ªrm could take to bargain with or affect the
state planner for a higher price.
p q c r m cit
e
jt it it it=
− − −
−1
1 1 1
1
1lg s h l b l f l l( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) q( - ) wDt , (7)
where, ªrst, r is the cost of capital. The ªrm can strategically raise the cost of ªnance
or capital, such as take more bank loans to ªnance its projects, set up a higher depre-
ciation rate, and so forth, in bargaining a higher price to offset part of the ªnance
costs. The second is a fuel price or raw material price denoted by m in equation (7),
which shows that the ªrm could ask the planner to pass their costs through due to a
higher input costs. The third is the overall average unit cost in the previous period,
denoted by cit1 in equation (7), in which the past cost could be used as a starting
point for the price bargain between the state and the ªrm. We also consider the
proªtability state of the ªrm that can affect its bargain with the state. It is also possi-
ble that the ªrm could use the cost of rival ªrms (cj) as an indication of the cost envi-
ronment for the ªrm to bargain for a higher price. If the price serves partly as an in-
come distribution among power ªrms, then a soft price constraint will be expected
to help the loss-making ªrm receive a higher plan price than the proªt-making ªrm.
In equation (7), D denotes the proªtability state of 1 for proªts and 0 for losses.
We take the logarithm of equation (7) with further inclusion of a market share vari-
able (s), the average rival cost (cj), and other two dummy variables of location (DL)
and afªliation (DA) in our econometric model of the plan price bargaining:
ln pit    glnqit  lnsit  hlncjt  blnrit  flnmit  qlncit1  dt
 d dt
L
t
A
it+ +k m ,
(8)
where  is disturbance term with normal distribution, g 	
, b (1  	), and
h (1  	), f (1  	), q (1  	).
To pursue the robustness test, we break the cost of capital (r) according to interest
rate (i_r) and depreciation rate (d_r):
ln pit    glnqit  lnsit  hlncjt  b1lni_rit  b2lnd_rit  flnmit
 qlncit1  dt  d dt
L
t
A+ +k m .
(9)
Moreover, we also test the price-cost margin (pM) impact of the bargaining factors:
ln pit
M    glnqit  lnsit  hlncjt  blnrit  flnmit  lnLFit
 dt  xd dt
L
t
A
it+ +k r ,
(10)
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ln pit
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 lnLFit  dt  xd dt
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where we add the load factor (LF; this represents actual output over the expected
maximal output in the full capacity) in equations (10) and (11) to further test if there
is a soft price constraint effect on the proªt margin in the plan price, since the state
planner could set up a high proªt-margin price for a ªrm with a lower load factor in
order to provide the ªrm with a favorable price as a budget support to subsidies or
compensate the ªrm that has a lower capacity utilization.
5. Estimation of the pricing model
5.1 Data description
Data from two sources were used to test models (8), (9), (10), and (11). One is the
ªnancial and accounting data of all individual power ªrms during the period from
1999 to 2005, prepared by the State Bureau of Statistics of China. Another is from the
Electricity Annals of China (2005, 2006) that published the generated volume and in-
stalled capacity in kWh per year for each of the 110 power ªrms located in the ªve
southern provinces in China in 2003, 2004, and 2005. The combination of the two
data sets provides a 3-year short panel as a sample for testing the pricing behavior
of Chinese coal-ªred power ªrms. The variables used in estimation of the models
are deªned as follows.
Price (pit): On-grid prices are an annual-based ex factory plan price ªxed by the
state through negotiation with the ªrm. Once the price is agreed, then the ªrm can
settle its sales revenues with the grid company according to the ªrm’s volume taken
by the grid over a year. This allows us to use an annual-based on-grid price as the
dependent variable for models (8) and (9), which is calculated from the annual sales
revenues of electricity of the ªrm divided by its volume sold per year. Our construc-
tion of the price is different from Lam (2004): in this paper, it is the plan price of the
ªrm to sell its produced power to the grid company; Lam used a regional price of
the end users for his study.
The paper also tests the proªt margin of the plan price for models (10) and (11), and
the price margin is calculated using the sales revenue divided by the total costs of
the ªrm.
The regional output of electricity (q) and market share (s): Because the Electric-
ity Annals list all of power ªrms located in the South that sell the power to the
Southern State Grid Corporation, we then can calculate the total output of the re-
gion by summing their outputs sold to the regional monopolist grid. Once we have
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the total output of the region, then it is easy to derive a ªrm’s market share by divid-
ing an individual ªrm’s output by the regional total. Each ªrm’s annual volume
produced is reported in the Electricity Annals of China (2004, 2005, 2006).
The unit cost (c): The unit cost variable is the sum of the costs of sale (covering all
variable costs, wages, and depreciation) plus overhead, in which the sum is divided
by the annual volume of power bought by the grid. To capture the effect of the cost
environment on price bargain, we use the variable of the average unit cost of the ri-
val ªrms.2 Furthermore, we also take the lagged unit cost of the ªrm to test the effect
of the past cost information on the bargain. One advantage of using the lagged unit
cost variable and the rival cost variable is to help avoid a potentially direct endoge-
nous problem in our short-panel estimation.
The cost of capital (r): The cost of capital variable consists of two components.
One is an interest rate that is calculated using reported account information on the
annual ªnance costs (mainly interest payments) and the total of outstanding interest
loans. The second is the depreciation rate calculated from the ªrm’s report on the
annual cost of depreciation and the book value of ªxed assets. The sum of these two
elements gives the cost of capital for our model tests. We also place interest and de-
preciation separately in regression for the robustness tests to see which component
will have a more signiªcant role in inºuencing the price bargain.
Fuel inºation (m): The fuel-inºationary variable is measured by the ratio of the
coal cost per unit of electricity generated at year t to the same unit cost at year t  1.
The ratio reºects a change in the unit of costs, indicating the inºation on the cost of
coal if the technological efªciency remains unchanged over a year. The cost of coal is
from the reported annual cost of sales minus both total wage costs and depreciation
charges, which gives the residual as a proxy of the costs of material inputs that con-
sist of mainly coal consumed by coal-ªred power ªrms.
Load factor (LF): The load factor, known as the capacity utilization rate, is the ra-
tio between the actual output generated by a power plant and the output that the
plant would have produced at its full installed capacity at time t. It is an indicator of
the capacity utilization of the power ªrm.
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2 This is deªned as cjt  [ ] / ( )c c nkt
k
n
it
=
∑ − −
1
1 , where n is the total number of sample ªrms in
time t, cit is the unit cost of the individual ªrm i in the time t with k ≠ i. The rival cost vari-
able reºects those rival ªrms in the same region but excluding the one i.
5.2 Estimation and interpretation
Pricing models (8), (9), (10), and (11) are estimated using the panel data ªxed-effect
estimation to run regressions against a panel sample of 110 ªrms over three years:
2003, 2004, and 2005. After dropping those lagged observations and extremes, there
are only two years of observations that are valid to run ªxed-effect-panel regres-
sions. Our estimated results are given in Table 6.
Overall, the price bargaining model is estimated rigorously across different spe-
ciªcations including both models that have the price and price margin as a depend-
ent variable, respectively, to have a robustness test on the consistency of estimations.
The estimation of the model is statistically consistent with our theoretical expecta-
tions. Although the panel sample is ºat in terms of time horizon, the ªrm-speciªc
ªxed effects are controlled by having ªrm dummies in all of the regressions.
Interestingly, the state of proªtability as an indicator reºecting the ªnancial condi-
tion of the ªrm is negatively related to both the price and the price margin, in which
the signiªcance of the proªtability dummy appears across all four estimations. This
ªnding suggests that the state sets a lower plan price for the proªtable ªrms and a
higher plan price for the less proªtable ªrms. Clearly this indicates that the price is
used as an instrument to help subsidize the loss-making ªrms by authorizing them
to charge more. The evidence of the soft price constraint on costs can be further
shown by the sign of the load factor variable in determining the price margin: The
higher price margin is set up by the state to the ªrms with a lower utilization of
their capacity. Capacity utilization increasing with ªrm size was evident in Lopez
(2006) in the study of UK coal-ªred power ªrms, the larger the ªrm, the higher the
utilization rate will be. This view is echoed by Chinese counterparts (see Tables 6
and 7). The link between capacity utilization and capacity size is because the large
ªrms with the economic scale attract demand (Stewart 1979; Bateson and Swan
1989) and therefore stimulate a higher utilization. As shown in Tables 6 and 7, the
negative relationship between the load factor and price margin implies that the state
protects the weak ªrms by allowing them to sell at a higher plan price to compen-
sate their high cost. Table 7 further illustrates the evidence in support of our inter-
pretation of the estimates—the effect of a soft price constraint on costs.
As explained by our price bargaining model, the sign of the coefªcient of the aggre-
gate output (q) reºects the importance of electricity to economic growth. The nega-
tive sign of the variable and the high marginal output of the power supply indicate
that the Chinese economic growth is highly responsive to power supply. This inter-
pretation is further reºected by the close link of electricity output with GDP over
time in China; this link is in sharp contrast to the UK’s wedge-like relationship—
86 Asian Economic Papers
Understanding the Performance of the Electric Power Industry in China
87 Asian Economic Papers
Understanding the Performance of the Electric Power Industry in China
Ta
b
le
6.
T
h
e
d
et
er
m
in
an
ts
of
th
e
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
p
ri
ce
s
of
th
e
co
al
-ª
re
d
p
ow
er
p
ro
d
u
ce
rs
in
C
h
in
a—
E
st
im
at
io
n
of
p
ri
ci
n
g
m
od
el
s
(8
),
(9
),
(1
0)
,
an
d
(1
1)
M
od
el
8
L
og
p
ri
ce
M
od
el
9
L
og
p
ri
ce
M
od
el
10
L
og
p
ri
ce
-c
os
tm
ar
gi
n
M
od
el
11
L
og
p
ri
ce
-c
os
tm
ar
gi
n
In
d
ep
en
d
en
tv
ar
ia
b
le
C
oe
fª
ci
en
t
t-
st
at
is
ti
c
C
oe
fª
ci
en
t
t-
st
at
is
ti
c
C
oe
fª
ci
en
t
t-
st
at
is
ti
c
C
oe
fª
ci
en
t
t-
st
at
is
ti
c
C
on
st
an
t
2.
42
7
1.
8
1.
98
9
1.
4
2.
82
0*
**
3.
7
2.
83
7*
*
3.
2
To
ta
lo
ut
pu
to
ft
he
re
gi
on
(L
og
Q
t
1)

0.
32
1

1.
9

0.
05
9

1.
3

0.
33
5*
**

3.
4

0.
33
5*
*

3.
0
A
ve
ra
ge
co
st
of
ri
va
lp
ro
d
uc
er
s
(L
og
c j
t)
0.
62
8*
**
4.
4
0.
41
5*
2.
4
A
ve
ra
ge
co
st
of
ri
va
ls
[L
og
(c
jt/
c i
t
1)
]
0.
10
0
1.
9
0.
10
6
1.
6
M
ar
ke
ts
ha
re
of
th
e
ªr
m
(L
og
s i
t
1)
0.
02
6
0.
8

0.
00
7

0.
3
0.
03
2
1.
9
0.
03
8
1.
9
L
ag
ge
d
co
st
of
th
e
ªr
m
(L
og
c i
t
1)
0.
22
2*
**
3.
6
0.
15
5*
2.
1
C
os
to
fc
ap
it
al
(L
og
r i
t)
0.
04
9*
*
3.
0

0.
01
6

1.
3
In
te
re
st
ra
te
(L
og
i_
r i
t)
0.
03
3*
*
2.
7

0.
00
2

0.
2
D
ep
re
ci
at
io
n
ra
te
(L
og
d
_r
it
)
0.
02
4
1.
1

0.
01
0

0.
5
Pr
ic
e
in
º
at
io
n
of
co
al
(L
og
m
it
)
0.
27
7*
**
6.
7
0.
19
2*
**
4.
0

0.
10
0*
*

2.
7

0.
11
0*
*

2.
4
L
oa
d
fa
ct
or
(L
og
L
f it

1)

0.
12
4*
*

3.
2

0.
13
3*
*

2.
9
Pr
oª
ta
bi
lit
y
of
th
e
po
w
er
ªr
m
(1
fo
r
pr
oª
t,
0
fo
r
lo
ss
)

0.
12
7*
**

4.
0

0.
07
3*

2.
1

0.
06
5*

2.
2

0.
05
9

1.
8
L
oc
at
io
n
of
th
e
po
w
er
ªr
m
(1
in
G
ua
ng
d
on
g,
0
in
ot
he
rs
)
0.
22
9*
2.
5

0.
15
2
21
.9

0.
14
7

1.
7
A
fª
lia
ti
on
of
th
e
po
w
er
ªr
m
(1
w
it
h
ce
nt
ra
l,
0
w
it
h
lo
ca
l)

0.
30
9*
*

2.
6

0.
17
8

1.
5

0.
19
0

1.
9

0.
18
1

1.
6
R
2
(a
d
ju
st
ed
)
0.
98
0.
95
0.
66
2
0.
61
2
St
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
r
of
es
ti
m
at
io
n
0.
11
8
0.
11
0
0.
09
8
0.
10
5
N
um
be
r
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
19
1
18
0
19
1
18
0
N
um
be
r
of
pl
an
ts
99
96
99
96
H
au
sm
an
te
st
on
ªr
m
ef
fe
ct
(
2 )
a
12
.5
9
32
.5
9
34
.4
2
33
.7
3
So
ur
ce
:T
he
da
ta
ar
e
ob
ta
in
ed
fr
om
th
e
N
at
io
na
lS
ta
ti
st
ic
s
B
ur
ea
u
of
C
hi
na
,a
nd
th
e
re
su
lt
s
ar
e
ge
ne
ra
te
d
by
th
e
au
th
or
s’
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n.
N
ot
e:
a.
H
0:
di
ffe
re
nc
e
in
co
ef
ªc
ie
nt
s
no
ts
ys
te
m
at
ic
.
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
:L
og
pr
ic
e
in
M
od
el
8
an
d
M
od
el
9;
lo
g
pr
ic
e-
co
st
m
ar
gi
n
in
M
od
el
10
an
d
M
od
el
11
.
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
*S
ta
ti
st
ic
al
ly
si
gn
iª
ca
nt
at
th
e
5
pe
rc
en
tl
ev
el
.*
*S
ta
ti
st
ic
al
ly
si
gn
iª
ca
nt
at
th
e
1
pe
rc
en
tl
ev
el
.*
**
St
at
is
ti
ca
lly
si
gn
iª
ca
nt
at
th
e
0.
1
pe
rc
en
tl
ev
el
.
almost unlinking the two. The reliance of China’s economic growth on power is ob-
vious,3 because its half of GDP come from manufacturing, and for the UK it was
only 27 percent in 2007. This creates a growth-driven incentive or pressure on the
state to seek more power supplied at a cheaper cost.
The growth-driven effect on the price is subject to the cost constraint that can affect
the sustainable development of the power industry, however. Estimation of the cost
impact on prices in Table 6 clearly sheds light on this argument. For instance, all of
the cost-related variables, such as the business condition of costs measured by the
cost of rival ªrms (cj), the lagged cost effect of the ªrm on price adjustment (ct1),
and the fuel cost inºation (m), are signiªcantly positive related to the price. If we
add the estimated coefªcients of these three cost variables together minus the
coefªcient of the price impact of the demand, we ªnd that the net cost impact is
about 0.756 (0.415  0.155  0.195  0.039) in the ªrst column of Table 6, and 0.806
(0.628  0.212  0.277  0.321) in the second column. The net cost impact means
that on average the state allows an increase in the price by 0.8 percent in response to
a 1 percent increase in the total costs after taking into account a demand pressure on
lowering the price of supply. The ªnding implies that, ªrst, the cost is the king in the
price bargain, and secondly, a plan price is an outcome of the balance of interests be-
tween various parties.
The balance of interests can be further shown by two estimations that represent two
opposite interests in affecting the price. One is about the cost pass-through. Table 6
shows that the ªrm has only roughly 20–28 percent of the rise in the coal cost passed
through to the price. The estimated 20 percent is the pure effect of changing coal
costs on the price, when others remain unchanged. The 20 percent of the cost pass-
though from the power ªrms to the end users through the monopolist grid com-
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3 Our regression of the Chinese GDP growth on the growth of its aggregate supply of power
over the period from 1970 to 2007 ªnds some 0.7 percent growth of GDP in response to
1 percent extra growth of electricity. The UK results are insigniªcant.
Table 7. Major business characteristics of power ªrms: Smallest vs. Largest
2004 2005
10 smallest ªrms 10 largest ªrms 10 smallest ªrms 10 largest ªrms
Average capacity (10 MW) 6.09 120.45 4.63 132.49
Average output (105 MWh) 2.56 77.05 2.09 80.08
Average load factor (%) 56.9 72.3 56.9 68.0
Average price (yuan/KWh) 0.459 0.331 0.539 0.340
Average unit cost (yuan/KWh) 0.471 0.256 0.563 0.274
Average operational proªt
(yuan/KWh)
(0.012) 0.075 (0.024) 0.066
Source: China Electricity Year Book 2005, China Electricity Year Book 2006.
pany led the end-user price to increase by some 20 percent in response to the rise in
the coal price in 2004 (Rosen and Houser 2007). In contrast to 40 percent of the high
cost pass-through in 1998 when the coal price was low, the recent lower cost pass-
through of the coal costs is due to the situation where the coal price has surged rap-
idly since 2004 (see Figure 11). In response to this dramatic volatile situation in the
upstream energy market, the state has become tougher in tightening its control on
the cost pass-through to stabilize the prices in the downstream sectors. Therefore,
the power ªrms are taken as “the price stabilizer” to play a key role in absorbing the
economic impact of the price volatility in the coal market that provides more than
70 percent of fuels of the nation for electric power generation.
To sustain the electricity industry, the power ªrms need a price that covers their
costs. With this expectation, the ªrm is likely to be motivated to pursue a high-cost
strategy to strengthen its bargain for a high price. The high-cost strategy provides
the ªrm with two advantages. First, it can help the ªrm raise more ªnancing from
both internal and external sources, such as setting a high depreciation rate to raise
more cash through saving the corporate tax costs, or taking a high interest rate to
help borrow more. Secondly, the high-cost strategy can help the ªrm transfer its ad-
ditional costs, particularly, the overhead costs, or any costs in relation to the rent-
seeking or equivalent, to the ªnal consumers through the price because of the soft
price constraint—the high cost is covered by the high price. So it is not surprising to
identify a positive link of the cost of ªnance with the price (see Table 6). This implies
that the ªrm gains more ªnance at the expense of the public that pays the high price
to cover the high costs of ªnance. Apparently, due to lack of competitive pressure on
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Figure 11. The real GDP index and the power consumption index of China and the UK
(1990–2006)
Source: UNdata, International Energy Agency, and the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
the ªrm to set its costs, the balance of interests in the price bargain is hard to keep
without a bias toward the corporate favors, and then the plan price has to be set in
accommodating the price failure in acting as a hard constraint on costs, leading the
ªrm to beneªt from its high-cost strategy.
6.Conclusions
After three decades of market-oriented reform, China’s electricity sector is still regu-
lated by the state plan. There are four parties involved in the plan: the coal produc-
ers, the power producers, the power distributor, and the power consumers. Each
party is linked by three plan prices: the plan price for the sale of the electricity coal
to power producers, the plan price for the sale of electric power to the distributor,
and the plan price for the distributor to resell the power to the end users.
The coal producers have no incentive to supply electricity coal because the price of
the electricity coal is lower than the market value. The power ªrms cannot offer the
market price of coal to produce more power in excess of the planned output because
of two constraints: the plan price for selling power is too low to cover the cost of
coal at the market price, and the plan supply of the cheaper electricity coal is limited
(Figure 12). Therefore, the coexistence of surplus in generation capacity and the
shortage of power supply in the economy often happens.
We ªnd that the plan price is a negotiated outcome that takes into account the inter-
ests of various parties. The bargaining mechanism compromises the public interest
by instituting a soft price constraint on the costs of the ªrm. This explains why the
price of electricity in China is similar to the price in the OECD even though China
has lower cost in investment, coal, labor, and environmental protection. This cost
inefªciency could even offset the advantages of the current “new reformed plan”
system in stimulating the rapid expansion of power generation capacity.
How should the current plan supply be reformed further to address the problem of
cost inefªciency? Should China undertake full liberalization from the coal price to
the end-user price like in the UK? In our opinion, the growth of the Chinese econ-
omy relies more on the use of electric power than the UK. The economic growth is
essential for job creation. The growth concern explains why the government intends
to retain the price control to the power supply. Price control deters further reform of
the current “new reform plan.” It impedes the resolution of two critical challenges:
improving cost efªciency and increasing effective supply, in particular, increasing
the supply of electricity coal to the power producers at an affordable price.
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